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Abstract 
A growing evidence suggests that climate change should be viewed as a financial risk 
that has to be factored into investment decision making. This study has taken a look at 
how institutional asset owners view their portfolio exposure to climate investment risk. 
The topical literature and existing to date research was reviewed. The interviews with the 
representatives of UK’s largest institutional asset owners were carried out. The study 
found that the climate investment risk is largely recognised among institutional asset 
owners, though levels of recognition vary. Generally, the risk is perceived to be lower 
and less probable than that projected by researchers. The underlying causes of varying 
degrees of climate investment risk recognition are found to be in short-termist approach 
to investment and high reliance on third parties to manage climate investment risk.   
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
AODP – Asset Owners Disclosure Project 
COP – Conference of the Parties (annual summit of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signatories) 
CTI – Carbon Tracker Initiative 
GRI – Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and the Environment at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
IEA – International Energy Agency 
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IPIECA – the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues 
(formerly International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association) 
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1. Introduction 
This is not so much about limiting business impacts on the environment,  
but about limiting the environment’s impact on business. 
Seb Beloe, Head of Sustainability Research at WHEB (2012) 
 
A growing consensus says that global action against climate change will most likely lead 
to financial disincentives and bigger financial losses when governments agree on a 
mechanism to restrict emissions and the exploitation of fossil fuel reserves (IEA, 2013). 
This would have major implications for institutional asset owners.  
The impact of investors’ activities on the climate (known as ‘look inside out’) had been 
part of the debate for some time now, however, the discussion has now shifted towards 
understanding how changing climate may affect the investment environment (known as 
‘look outside in’) (Porter and Reinhardt, 2007). It is forecasted that the management of 
natural capital will be integral to investment performance over the next few decades 
(Beloe, 2012). 
We see to date there has been little substantial research into investor actions upon 
sustainable investment. It would be clearly of interest to learn therefore how UK’s largest 
institutional asset owners view their portfolio exposure to climate investment risk.  
Research objectives: 
• To identify how portfolio exposure to climate investment risk is viewed by a 
sampling of the UK’s largest institutional asset owners. 
• To examine the causes of varying institutional approaches towards climate 
investment risk. 
• To examine differences in perception between professionals working in 
investment versus experts from academia, consultancies, and advocacy groups. 
The paper is organised in the following manner: first, the study is set to review the 
topical literature and outline the boundaries of the known domain of climate change as a 
financial risk. Subsequently, the methodology of the qualitative research that was carried 
out is discussed. Finally, the paper aims to analyse and critically evaluate the differences 
in climate investment risk perception of the interviewees compared to the literature. As a 
result, the probable causes of varying institutional approaches are identified, implications 
are discussed, and the recommendations are given. 
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2. Literature Review 
Institutional asset owners are now required to consider an increasing number of 
investment risks (Murninghan and Grant, 2013), and a notable proportion of those risks 
are not financial in nature. In recent years, however, we have learnt of mounting 
evidence of the financial materiality of non-financial issues (ibid.). Arguably, the most 
pressing of those issues is climate change. As Rajendra K. Pachauri, chairman of the 
IPCC, put it, “Nobody on this planet is going to be untouched by the impacts of climate 
change” (Gillis, 2014, np). In this section, based on the literature from academia, 
consultancies, and advocacy groups, it will be shown that climate change can and 
should be viewed as a financial risk that has to be factored into investment decision 
making. 
2.1 Stranded Assets 
A rather common and hotly debated understanding of climate investment risk is that of 
stranded assets, which largely draws on the concept of ‘carbon budget’. Carbon budget 
(with ‘carbon’ denoting carbon dioxide (CO2) here and henceforth) refers to total 
allowable emissions of greenhouse gases globally in the period up to 2050 in order to 
keep global warming below two degrees Celsius (2°C), compared with pre-industrial 
levels, as agreed by global governments under the Cancun Accord at COP-16 in 2010 
(IEA, 2013). This budget, however, is not fixed; in fact, it fluctuates depending on 
different scenarios with various probabilities (see Appendix 1), leaving space for 
speculation. 
Carbon budget informs the concepts of ‘unburnable carbon’ and ‘stranded assets’. 
Burning and converting to energy all fossil fuels listed on the world’s capital markets will 
inevitably breach the global carbon budget (Ward, 2013). IEA (2012) had previously 
estimated that only a third of total fossil fuel reserves can be burnt. This was further 
confirmed by the GRI analysis (Ward, 2013), which adjusted the estimation to 40% in 
what they called ‘the idealised scenario’ and just 20% taking a precautionary approach. 
60–80% of fossil fuel reserves of listed coal, oil and gas companies are therefore 
unburnable, yet they are assigned value in the financial statements of those companies. 
When such reserves lose value or turn into liabilities before the end of their expected 
economic life due to being unburnable, they become stranded assets. These findings 
pose a major risk for investors, and an even bigger threat to the global economy if 
current investment trends continue (IPCC, 2014; Mercer, 2015). 
While it has been argued that markets are mispricing risk by valuing companies as if all 
their reserves will be burned, IPIECA (2014) and several other representatives of the 
fossil fuel industry (Hone, 2013; Statoil, 2015) have called those arguments speculative 
and suggested they were based on a number of assumptions, the most prominent of all 
being the belief that global governments will actually act upon the Cancun Accord and 
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commit to drastically cutting carbon emissions. Such a view is not ungrounded, as the 
Paris agreement, expected to be forged at COP-21 in 2015, will be largely based on 
individual nations’ pledges, which then have to be held to account – the process that is 
historically known to be flawed, most notably US Congress having never ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol signed at COP-3 in 1997, with a subsequent withdrawal of Canada 
(Clark, 2015).  
Regulation, however, is not the only risk able to strand assets. Research (Caldecott and 
McDaniels, 2014; Paun et al., 2015) has identified a number of further drivers, including 
economics (fall of oil prices), technology innovation (energy efficiency and 
advancements in renewables), litigation (carbon liability), evolving social norms and 
economic behaviour, etc. The Russian rouble collapse in late 2014 and an ongoing 
financial crisis is an example of how a potential fall in fossil fuel prices might take a 
heavy toll on an economy (although other important factors, such as international 
sanctions, have also played a major role (Gregory, 2015)). 
Mercer (2015) has factored some of the aforementioned drivers into their investment 
modelling analyses, which showed the inevitability of the impact of climate change risks 
on investment returns. Investors are therefore urged to hedge their position by viewing 
climate change as an investment variable, shifting governance focus beyond the next 
quarter, and giving due attention to long-term issues (ibid.). GRI (Ward, 2013) reinforces 
this stance by suggesting that, given the situation, the investment process is flawed, as it 
defines risk as a deviation from the performance or market benchmarks. Evaluating 
investment against such benchmarks, which are based on past performance, might 
become inadequate in the light of newly evident long-term climate-related risks. It is thus 
clear that business-as-usual is no longer an option and short-termism would jeopardise 
investment goals. 
2.2 Climate Degradation 
Stranded assets is not the only financial risk to be taken into account. A warmer climate 
is bound to result in severe environmental change and natural capital depletion and 
degradation, posing systemic risks to financial stability (Caldecott and McDaniels, 2014). 
Mercer (2015) reports that, under a four degrees Celsius (4°C) scenario, chronic 
weather changes would negatively affect asset classes such as agriculture, timberland, 
real estate, and emerging market equities. VICE News (2015) brings to our attention 
that if low-lying nations are to be wiped off the map due to rising sea levels, it will have 
grave economic repercussions for nation states hosting climate refugees. Those are the 
risks seen on the longer investment horizon, but if not addressed now, they would have 
tremendous financial ramifications in the not-so-distant future. Such dichotomy of the 
two realities is highlighted in the Carbon Trust (2015) report: most businesses recognise 
that more radical changes are needed to face yet seemingly distant challenges, but 
suffice themselves with a modest change in order to meet today’s needs. 
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2.3 Implications for Investors 
In 2014, Second Swedish National Pension Fund (AP2, 2014, np) has notably divested 
from 12 coal and 8 oil-and-gas production companies, having stated that it is ‘highly 
likely’ that these companies may lose value due to ‘serious climate-related financial 
risks’ such as stranded assets. In fact, HSBC Global Research (Paun et al., 2015) 
identified 23 institutional asset owners (mostly American and European endowments 
and pension funds) who announced full or partial divestment from fossil fuel companies 
in the period from 2013 to 2015. Although divestment is not the sole strategy for 
managing climate investment risk, a growing number of institutional investors taking this 
pathway signals a certain solidarity of the investment community with the research 
professionals. 
A number of academics have examined the implications of climate investment risk for 
institutional asset owners. Jones et al. (2013) have modelled the impact of resource 
constraints on the actuarial profession. Brimble et al. (2010) looked at the regulatory role 
in managing climate investment. Baker (2009) and Guyatt et al. (2012) elaborated on the 
strategical decision making in relation to climate change uncertainty. The question 
clearly remains how institutional asset owners view their portfolio exposure to climate 
investment risk. This is the very problem that the current paper seeks to investigate. 
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3. Methodology  
From the literature review herein, it is evident that further research is required into the 
institutional investors’ perspective on climate change as an investment risk. The key 
research question of this study is how institutional asset owners view their portfolio 
exposure to climate investment risk. In particular, the paper will examine the extent of 
recognition of climate investment risk and approaches to its management among UK’s 
largest trust-based defined contribution schemes (see below). 
The following procedure was employed to identify relevant participants. The AODP 
(2015a) Global Climate 500 index that has rated and ranked world’s largest institutional 
asset owners (including pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, 
and endowments) was taken as the basis for this study. Further filtering criteria were 
applied: 
• The United Kingdom was selected as a geographical relevance criterion. 
• ‘Leaders’ were separated from ‘laggards’, i.e. D and X rated investors, according 
to the AODP (2015b) methodology and rating. ‘Laggards’ have been identified by 
AODP to do little or nothing to address climate investment risk, and are therefore 
of limited relevance to this study. 
• Trust-based schemes were separated from contract-based funds due to 
differences in regulation. The latter are regulated as financial products, whereas 
the former have designated fiduciaries (usually the Board of Trustees) who are 
legally bound to ‘exercise their investment powers in the interests of members 
and beneficiaries’ (The Pensions Regulator, 2015, np), the concept also known 
as ‘fiduciary duty’. Some activist lawyers have argued that the need for asset 
owners to account for climate change related investment risks sits at the core of 
their fiduciary duty (Smith, 2015). 
• Defined contribution (DC) schemes were separated from defined benefit (DB) 
and hybrid schemes. Members of DB schemes receive pension promised by the 
provider, which doesn’t depend on investments. Members of DC schemes have 
to deal with a fluctuating value of their pension depending on investment 
performance (Gov.uk, 2015). They are directly affected by the investment 
decisions of their fiduciaries. 
The pool of institutional investors directly accountable for investing beneficiaries’ money 
was thus created. From it, key persons were singled out and subsequently contacted 
requesting a research interview. By talking to the identified representatives of the 
investment industry, it was anticipated to get a first-hand perspective on climate change 
viewed as a financial risk by institutional asset owners. Due heed was paid to ethical 
issues throughout the process. The interview questionnaire was compiled based on the 
literature review section. The semi-structured approach was chosen in order to have 
flexibility in addressing individual issues different asset owners deal with. The interviews 
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with three representatives of different asset owners were carried out either remotely or in 
person, recorded (having asked for permission verbally), anonymised, and transcribed to 
allow for further data collation and analysis. The main themes used for further analysis 
emerged from the common threads in the interviews. The synthesis of the interview data 
was achieved by adapting the procedure used by Killian (2010). The findings are 
presented and the conclusions are drawn in the sections that follow. Due to the small 
sample size and a limited scope of the research, the claims that are further made can 
only be viewed in the context of the current case study, and they are not representative 
of the investment industry as a whole. 
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4. Findings 
The research has found that the climate investment risk is largely recognised among 
institutional asset owners, though levels of recognition vary. Generally, the risk is 
perceived to be lower and less probable than that projected by IPCC (2014), Mercer 
(2015), and other researchers, as described in the Literature Review section. The 
underlying causes of varying degrees of climate investment risk recognition are found to 
be in short-termist approach to investment and high reliance on third parties to manage 
climate investment risk.  
This section explores the major themes that have emerged from the interviews (see 
Table 1), while the section that follows discusses research findings in more detail and 
examines the differences in the perception of climate investment risk between 
institutional asset owners and the literature review. 
 
Main themes: Interview with a Trustee 
Chair (AO1) 
Interview with a Head of 
Investment Operations (AO2) 
Interview with a 
Sustainability Manager (AO3) 
Recognition of climate 
investment risk 
Recognises to a level of being 
aware of it 
Recognises across various 
asset classes 
They are going to measure the 
carbon footprint of their 
portfolio 
Low perceived risk of climate 
investment 
Doesn’t see it as a big or 
probable risk; still sees fossil 
fuels to be profitable in the long 
run 
Admits it’s not a risk they 
quantified; still sees potential in 
fossil fuel investments; talks 
about sustainability premium 
Admits their trustees are 
uncertain about the issue and 
the research behind it 
Short-termist approach to 
investment 
Thinks climate risk is only to be 
looked at if it is affecting the 
industry at present 
Views short-termism as a 
‘natural thing’ 
Believes in investment in fossil 
fuels despite having admitted 
its long-term loss-making 
High reliance on third parties to 
manage climate investment 
risk 
Believes asset managers are 
able to make the best decision 
and are not to be instructed 
Their board considers forming 
a directive, but currently only 
delegates responsibility 
They only provide third parties 
with the relevant information, 
then rely on their decisions 
Table 1. Research Findings 
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5. Discussion 
An analysis of the interviews revealed four broad themes of the differences in the 
perception of climate investment risk and their underlying causes. Those are: recognition 
of climate investment risk, low perceived risk of climate investment, short-termist 
approach to investment, and high reliance on third parties to manage climate investment 
risk. 
5.1 Recognition of climate investment risk 
The research has found that the climate investment risk is largely recognised among 
institutional asset owners, though levels of recognition vary. While AO1 believes she has 
to be aware of the risk in her role, AO2 fully recognises the risk on the personal level, but 
admits that their institution hasn’t yet quantified or addressed the risk as needed. At the 
moment of interviewing AO3, they were planning to quantify the risk by measuring the 
carbon footprint of their portfolio and then taking appropriate actions. 
This finding should not be surprising per se, as all represented asset owners were rated 
highly on the AODP Global Climate 500 index, meaning they have taken certain actions 
to address and manage the risk posed by the likelihood of stranded assets and climate 
degradation, as outlined in the literature review. However, the implications of this finding 
inform the causes of varying approach to managing climate investment risk on the 
portfolio level. 
5.2 Low perceived risk of climate investment 
Generally, the risk is perceived to be lower and less probable than that projected by 
IPCC (2014), Mercer (2015), and other researchers. In fact, some see it as “one in one 
thousand years event” (AO1), whereas research suggests it’s going to be a variety of 
devastating events that are almost certain to happen if two degrees target is not 
achieved (IPCC, 2014; Mercer, 2015). Others admit to having a limited knowledge on 
the topic. 
When asked to comment on the industry as a whole, interviewees were succinct: “For a 
lot of asset owners, I don’t think this risk is a big issue” (AO1). “They don’t believe that 
this is something they have to get worked up about at this time, rightly or wrongly. It’s a 
challenge to get it up the agenda” (AO2). This indicates that AP2 (2014) and 23 others 
(Paun et al., 2015) who have recently shown solidarity with the issue might as well be 
the only institutional asset owners perceiving climate investment risk as high.  
Such understanding may be conditioned by a strong belief in profitability of fossil fuels. 
Two of the three persons interviewed believed that fossil fuel industry still has potential. 
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The third person admitted that the business case for coal was clear-cut, yet she still 
hoped that the profitability might be restored due to technological advancement (such as 
carbon capture and storage) or failure of global governments to form an agreement at 
COP-21. A belief forms the basis for such thinking, therefore, belief in profitability of 
fossil fuels will result in a lesser interest in sustainable investment, and, vice versa, belief 
in sustainability premium will result in shifting capital away from carbon-heavy 
investment: 
It’s difficult, but it does involve a belief, because essentially what you’re 
saying is that these types of assets should be avoided, because the 
risk/return trade-off is not as good as for investment in a sustainable 
company. And the reason why that trade-off isn’t so good is because 
actually all these risks (regulatory, political, etc.) that are associated with 
these, are not associated with these other companies. There is a tie-up 
between sustainable investing and thinking that there is a sustainability 
premium that you can get by investing away from mining, oil companies, 
and so on. (AO2) 
The recent history of subprime mortgage crisis demonstrates that risk can indeed be 
mispriced. This parallel was voluntarily drawn by one of the interviewees, and yet she 
failed to apply same judgement to climate investment risk: 
There could be an event any day that makes us say ‘why didn’t we pay 
any attention to that’. Governance is an enormous risk. […] With a benefit 
of hindsight, we look back on the financial crisis, we all knew that nobody 
had a clue of what they were doing in the banks. You would say that 
governance is a long-term risk, but then something happens, and the 
whole thing blows a huge hole in your portfolio. (AO1) 
5.3 Short-termist approach to investment 
The underlying causes of varying degrees of climate investment risk recognition are 
found to be in short-termist approach to investment and high reliance on third parties to 
manage climate investment risk. 
AO1 boldly stated that it isn’t her job to consider those risks unless they take place at 
present. AO3 admitted that investments in fossil fuels had no future, yet was willing to 
stick to them while they are still profitable, foregoing long-term risks. AO2 summarised: 
“That’s just a natural thing, the way the system just doesn’t respond to long-term 
threats”. 
The dichotomy of the two realities that was highlighted in the Carbon Trust (2015) report 
was clearly evident throughout the interviews: 
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Whereas lots of the climate change, we should be changing things now, 
in order to be in a better position in a 50 years time, no doubt about that, 
but the reality is that people just don’t have that longer horizon when it 
comes to investment. (AO2) 
5.4 High reliance on third parties to manage climate investment risk 
Ultimately, who is responsible for addressing climate investment risk? Persons 
interviewed had varying perspectives on the issue. While AO3 was exercising caution by 
saying that their trustees were ‘not yet ready’ to take on responsibility, AO1 was rather 
direct in dismissing the idea of managing climate investment risk as a part of her 
fiduciary duty: “It’s not my job to use [beneficiaries’] money to write social or 
environmental roles in the world”. PRI (2015) contradicts: “a decision not to invest in a 
high-carbon asset because of financial concerns about stranded assets is likely to be 
seen as consistent with fiduciary duties”. 
AO2, on the other hand, had a different perspective. According to him, trustees 
themselves need to decide whether managing climate investment risk is a part of their 
fiduciary duty. This belief would underpin their investment strategy. Such his position 
goes in accord with the recommendations of the Mercer’s report: 
To embed these considerations in the investment process, the first step is 
to develop climate-related investment beliefs alongside other investment 
beliefs. These can then be reflected in a policy statement, with related 
investment processes evolved accordingly. (Mercer, 2015) 
While asset owners ponder whether managing climate investment risk is a part of their 
fiduciary duty or not, they entrust third parties with this responsibility. All three confirmed 
they relied on the sustainability policies of their asset managers to address the issue. In 
fact, AO1 was strong in her belief that asset managers had higher expertise in it than 
her, and, therefore, she had no right to ‘second-guess’ them. 
 
  
 18 
6. Final section 
This study has served to expand knowledge in the field of sustainable investment. It 
showed the varying levels of climate investment risk acknowledgement. The argument 
that has been developing since at least COP-1 in 1995 doesn’t seem to have fully 
convinced institutional asset owners. The short-termist approach still prevail. 
The implications for policy and practice are therefore grave. As investors are unlikely to 
lead the necessary change, austere regulation is needed to set the framework for 
investment actions. 
The findings of this study should be interpreted with caution as the author only looked at 
a small sampling of institutional asset owners narrowed down by strict criteria for 
inclusion, thus, results are expected to be skewed. 
Further investigation is required to corroborate the findings. Future research might also 
shift the emphasis from the supply side (fossil fuel companies) onto various approaches 
to satisfying the demand (renewable energy, advancements in technology). 
Finally, recommendations for the industry are put forward: 
• Asset owners should work alongside with researchers accessing climate 
investment risk in order to achieve the level of detail that both parties are happy 
with. 
• Asset owners should seek longer investment horizon to be able to address long-
term risks. 
• Asset owners should take ownership for managing climate investment risk and 
decrease reliance on third parties. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Analysis of carbon budgets 
Each temperature target implies a different carbon budget. Here we explore the carbon 
budgets for temperature rises of 1.5, 2.0, 2.5 and 3.0°C. For each temperature rise we 
provide budgets which give a 50% probability and an 80% probability of limiting global 
warming to that level.  
The following are the fossil fuel carbon budgets from 2013 to 2049, taking into account 
annual emissions so far this century:  
Maximum temperature rise (°C) Fossil fuel carbon budget 2013–2049 (GtCO2) 
Probability of not exceeding  
temperature threshold 50% 80% 
1.5 525 - 
2.0 1075 900 
2.5 1275 1125 
3.0 1425 1275 
 
This budget, however, is only a fraction of the carbon embedded in the world’s indicated 
fossil fuel reserves, which amount to 2,860 GtCO2. 
Source: Ward, 2013. 
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Appendix 2: Interview questionnaire 
1. Do you consider the need to respond to climate change-related investment risk as a 
moral issue or a business case?  
2. What is your position on stranded assets risk in the most exposed fossil fuels sectors 
(i.e. North American coal production; tar sands oil in Canada, and various deep offshore 
oil plays)?  
CTI says: Stranded assets are fossil fuel energy and generation 
resources which, at some time prior to the end of their economic life (as 
assumed at the investment decision point), are no longer able to earn an 
economic return (i.e. meet the company’s internal rate of return), as a 
result of changes in the market and regulatory environment associated 
with the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
3. What is your policy on portfolio decarbonization as an investment strategy? What is 
your perspective on the UNEP FI’s Portfolio Decarbonization?  
Decarbonization is the process through which investors reduce portfolio 
exposure to greenhouse gas emissions and align their portfolios with the 
climate economy of the future. This includes current emissions as well as 
future emissions such as those embedded in fossil-fuel reserves. There 
are different approaches to portfolio decarbonization which can be 
achieved across asset classes, including engagement, divestment, as 
well as techniques such as ‘best-in-class’ and ‘negative screening’.  
4. Have you tracked whether the implementation of aspects of a portfolio 
decarbonization policy affected your financial returns?  
5. Is climate change risk an issue, which you feel asset consultancies provide adequate 
advice on? How do you feel asset managers rate in managing climate change risk? 
6. Do you consider protection of your fund’s investments from the risks associated with 
high-carbon assets as part of your fiduciary duty to protect member savings and 
maintain returns?   
7. How would you rate the ability of many UK's largest institutional asset owners to 
protect the investments of their members from carbon and climate risk? How does the 
UK financial industry perform with regards to peers in Europe and other jurisdictions with 
regards to reporting and disclosure on climate risk?  
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